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Unlike those previous cases, which Appellant has cited as supporting authority, Edlin's repetition of J.H.'s statement did not directly identify Appellant as J. The statement, at most, only indirectly identified Appellant as the perpetrator, and even then, that is only the case when considered in light of all the other evidence in the case, which included the victim's testimony that Appellant was the perpetrator.For the reasons stated herein, the Court affirms Appellant's convictions and sentence. She also suspected Appellant harbored resentment toward her because she had recently had an abortion. Appellant had a gun during the attack, and threatened J. Appellant then grabbed a tube of Neosporin and spread it on his penis, turned J. over so she was laying face down on the bed, and inserted his penis into her anus. Appellant then retrieved a towel and bucket of water, wiped away blood from both of them, and then penetrated her vagina with his penis. H.'s words, “playing games.” Outside, she saw a friend, and ran to him asking to use his phone. “Rulings upon admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial judge; such rulings should not be reversed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.” Simpson v. Of particular significance, she repeated various statements from the victim about what had happened to her, including the victim's specific statement “We never had anal intercourse,” and testified that the victim's injuries to her neck were consistent with what the victim had reported. The bar on out-of-court statements, whether they are consistent with trial testimony or not, is not in KRE 801A or any other hearsay exception rule; it is in the hearsay rule itself.Because of her state, he asked her why she wanted to use the phone, and she told him to call her mother. A warrant was issued for Appellant's arrest, and he was eventually taken into custody. Appellant argues that the totality of Edlin's testimony was inadmissible because it served only to corroborate the victim's testimony by proof that she had previously made the same statements to Edlin, and it was not proper prior-consistent-statement testimony absent a recent claim of fabrication or improper influence. See KRE 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky.”).
In determining whether a statement falls within the scope of KRE 803(4), it must be determined whether the content of the declarant's statement was of the type “reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment or diagnosis,” Colvard v. Indeed, this information is critical in discerning the source of a victim's injuries by excluding other possible causes of injury.
In truth, an out-of-court statement will often fall under multiple hearsay exceptions in KRE 801A, 803, or 804, but it need only satisfy one of those exceptions (and, of course, be relevant and survive KRE 403) to be admissible. Appellant's argument assumes that because Edlin repeated some prior statements that are consistent with the victim's testimony, the admissibility of those statements can only be controlled by the prior-consistent-statement rule.
For example, Edlin repeated the victim's statement about the source of the injuries to her neck (manual strangulation), which was consistent with the victim's trial testimony.
W.2d at 517 (emphasis added), without complying with KRE 801A(a)(2) (or some other hearsay exception), the rule (and more importantly, the rule barring hearsay) has no effect on a witness's independent observation that corroborates the other person's testimony.
Simply, KRE 801A(a)(2) is only applicable to prior consistent statements, not additional consistent testimony based on personal knowledge.
Thus, the fact that there was no allegation of a recent fabrication, which is necessary for the statement to be admissible as a prior consistent statement under KRE 801A(a)(2), is irrelevant, as there is another ground to support admission of the out-of-court statement.